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STUDENT COMMENTS
LABOR LAW'S NEW FRONTIER: THE END OF THE
PER SE RULES
This article will explore and attempt to explain recent changes in the
national labor law wrought by the National Labor Relations Board and the
United States courts. The article will emphasize new doctrines which have
been expounded by the Board since the appointment to the Board of
Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown. 1 The changes in doctrine reflect
not only changes in Board personnel but also the growing reluctance of the
reviewing courts to enforce many of the earlier Board orders. Naturally,
many of the decisions of the reconstituted Board reflect the 1959 labor law
amendments passed by Congress as well as a belief that tried doctrines have
not always been true or useful doctrines.
In tracing these changes this article will divide the field into five major
areas: Representation, Secondary Boycott, Organizational and Recognitional
Picketing, Management Coercion and Hot Cargo agreements . 2 The modifi-
cations in all areas appear to stem from a unified philosophy and the
division is only for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATION
In one of its last decisions the old Board held that when two unions
are seeking to represent employees in a particular plant, with one union
seeking to represent both production and maintenance employees, and the
other union seeking to represent only the maintenance employees, the nar-
rower unit (maintenance) is inappropriate.3 The new Board permitted
review of the case and reversed on the basis that there was no evidence that
the employer's operation was so integrated that the maintenance employees
had lost their separate identity.' The new Board emphasized that the
maintenance employees are established in separate departmental sections
1 Chairman McCulloch was appointed March 7, 1961, and Member Brown
April 13, 1961.
2 The appendix lists all new Board modifications of old Board cases and classifies
them by LMRA Section.
3 American Cyanamid Co. (Pensacola Bldg. Trades Council) 130 N.L.R.B. 1,
47 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1961). There were three unions seeking to represent the employees,
but only two of the unions were involved in this particular dispute. The Council
wanted to represent a unit of maintenance and utility sections employees, while the
Textile Workers Union desired to represent a unit of production, maintenance and
utility employees. The maintenance men were part of the employer's engineering section
while the utility men were part of the employer's Production Department. The unit
sought by the Textile Workers Union apparently was composed of men in the em-
ployer's Plant, Production and Engineering Departments. There was no bargaining
history at the plant. The maintenance men worked closely with the production men
and had many of the same benefits.
4 American Cyanamid Co. (Pensacola Bldg. Trades Council) 131 N.L.R.B. No. 125,
48 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1961).
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and have their own supervisors. Most importantly, the new Board stated:
"We are convinced that collective bargaining units must be based on the
relevant evidence in each individual case."
In another aspect of appropriate unit determinations the new Board
swept out a policy venerated by the old Board. When a union seeking to
organize a larger unit in a partially organized plant was opposed by the
current bargaining agent which desired to continue its representation of the
current unit, the old Board determined the appropriateness of the units and
ordered an election. But the old Board held that if the current unit rejected
both unions, the formerly unrepresented unit must remain unrepresented. 5
The new Board in Felix Half and Brother, Inc.° altered this approach
to permit a pooling of votes. The Board held that if the previously repre-
sented employees rejected both unions but the combined vote of the current
unit and the new unit selected a union that union would represent both
groups in a single unit. Naturally, this decision was preceded by a determina-
tion that both units were appropriate and that the combined unit was ap-
propriate? This decision advances the design of the act more fully because
it permits the selection of a bargaining agent in a unit the Board has de-
5 Cook Paint and Varnish Co. (District 50, United Mine Workers), 127 N.L.R.B.
1098, 46 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1960). Here the Board directed an election in two groups.
Group one (the current unit) consisted of all production employees, warehouse em-
ployees, shipping and/or receiving clerks, but included employees in group two;
group two (the new unit) consisted of all maintenance employees, control technicians,
porters and/or janitors but excluded all employees in group one. The Board stated
that the following combinations were possible: group one selects the intervenor, and
group two rejects the petitioner; group one selects the intervenor, group two rejects
petitioner; both groups select the petitioner and there is one combined unit. But, ruled
the Board, if group one rejects both unions, group two must remain unrepresented
regardless of the vote in its group.
As late as March 9, 1961, the old Board in J. R. Simplot Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1283,
47 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1961), affirmed the validity of Waikiki Biltmore Inc., 127 N.L.R.B.
82, 45 L.R.R.M. 1511 (1960), which ruled that there shall he no pooling of votes
when the Board directs separate elections in units of currently represented employees
and currently unrepresented employees. Fairness, stated the Board, will be served by
forcing the union to demonstrate that it enjoys representative status in both the
current bargaining unit and the hitherto unrepresented unit before both may be com-
bined into one unit. But Simplot distinguished Waikiki Biltmore and directed
separate elections in two units when the unrepresented unit was more than forty times
larger than the currently represented unit. The Board in Waikiki Biltmore was
attempting to avoid the inclusion of the previously unrepresented employees in the
current unit if it voted to remain unrepresented. Also cf. Zia Co., note 6, infra.
Local 72, Office and Clerical Employees, Teamsters, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 135,
48 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1961). This decision merely activates an older Board practice
followed in the Zia Co. case, 109 N.L.R.B. 312, 34 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1954), modifying
108 N.L.R.B. No. 140, 34 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1954).
7 The Teamsters sought to organize a unit of office workers (the old unit) plus a
porter-clerk who performed duties as janitor and messenger for the office. The current
bargaining agent merely wanted to continue representation of the old unit. The Board
took notice of the fact that there was an inside salesman in the office who would be
denied representation if not included in one of these units. The Board determined
that the old unit was still appropriate, that a new unit consisting of the porter-clerk
and the inside salesman was appropriate and that the combined unit was appropriate.
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termined to be appropriate. Notice also that this decision is a reinforcement
of the American Cyanamidta decision' because it also holds that, where
a larger appropriate unit fails to select a bargaining agent, the smaller unit
is entitled to its own bargaining agent.
In still another area the new Board held that a unit of insurance
workers comprising only the employees in the employer's Alexandria,
Virginia, district office was an appropriate unit. 8 In so holding, the Board
overruled the policy of Metropolitan Life ins, which it had followed since
1944 and which had held inappropriate any unit of insurance workers not at
least company or state wide. When the latter case was decided the insurance
industry appeared to be undergoing a period of rapid organization promising
the benefits of collective bargaining to insurance agents on a broad base.
The Board then feared that to break the industry into many small units
would imperil the organization of the industry. The new Board noted that,
since the expected organization failed to materialize, the reason supporting
the rule was gone.
Litton Industries" in 1959, reaffirmed a long standing Board policy to
exclude technicians from a bargaining unit of other employees when the
unit placement of the technicians was contested. The rationale which the
Board found persuasive was that the technicians, because of their distinctive
training, experience and function, have different interests than other em-
ployees. The Board declared that it would scrutinize closely the classification
of an employee as a technician, but once the classification was made, the
issue was determined.
The new Board in the Sheffield 11 case overruled Litton to the extent of
the inconsistency. The Board ruled that:
. . . automatically excluding all technical employees from
production and maintenance units whenever their unit placement is
in issue is not a salutary way of achieving the purposes of the Act.
To do so is to give primacy in unit placement to the parties'
disagreement rather than to the overriding consideration of the
community of interests of such employees with the production and
maintenance employees. In order, therefore, to give effective
weight to such community of interest, we shall no longer utilize an
automatic placement formula, but shall, instead, make a pragmatic
judgment in each case based upon an analysis of the following
factors among others: desires of the parties, history of bargain-
7a Supra note 3.
8 Quaker City Life Ins. Co. (Insurance Workers Int'l) 134 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 49
L.R.R.M. 1281 (1961). The employer's operations encompass sixteen states. The
closest Virginia district office is 100 miles away. Excluding the district manager who
reports directly to the home office, the office force consists of five debit insurance agents
and one office clerical employee. The district manager has exclusive control of all
personnel in the district office.
9 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635, 14 L.R.R.M. 187 (1944).
10 125 N.L.R.B. 722, 45 L.R.R.M. 1166 (1959).
" Sheffield Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 49 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1961).
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ing, similarity of skills and job functions, common supervision, con-
tact and/or interchange with other employees, similarity of working
conditions, type of industry, organization of plant, whether the
technical employees work in separately situated and separately
controlled areas, and whether any union seeks to represent technical
employees separately. Of course, where the parties are in agree-
ment as to the unit placement of the technical employees, we shall,
in assessing all the above factors, give considerable weight to the
desires of the parties.
Once again the new Board has shown a desire to consider each case on its
own merits. It becomes increasingly apparent that the new Board is not
impressed with rigid formalisms. Yesterday's rule will not be today's rule
unless there are sound reasons, other than stare decisis, justifying the
continuation of the rule.
In another representation case of general interest, the Board has re-
versed the long standing practice of including driver-salesmen in the pro-
duction-maintenance employees union unless a union wants to represent
them separately or unless the parties agree that the driver-salesmen should
not be included in the unit of production and maintenance workers." The
old Board had treated the driver-salesmen as if they were truck drivers by
reasoning that driver-salesmen, truck drivers and production and main-
tenance men are all doing manual labor directly involved in the flow of
materials and, therefore, should be included in the same bargaining unit."
But in Plaza Provision" the new Board abandoned the rule on the
basis that:
Our experience has shown us that the duties of employees who
drive trucks or automobiles and distribute products of their em-
ployers from their vehicle may vary greatly, depending on the
given employer's sales and distribution policies and practices.
In some instances, the employees have little or no function in mak-
ing or promoting sales of the employer's products but are essentially
deIiverymen or truck drivers. In others, their function is clearly
selling and sales promotion, and driving vehicles is merely an inci-
dent of such function.
The Board promised to examine closely the facts of any case wherein
the driver-salesmen perform both functions in a more or less equal degree.
In the instant case the Board ruled that the interests of the route and special
salesmen were diverse from those of the warehousemen and drivers, ap-
parently on the bases that the salesmen were paid a salary plus incentive
bonuses while the drivers and warehousemen received only salary, and that
there was no "interchange" between the special and route salesmen and the
warehousemen and drivers. Member Rodgers, in dissent, thought that the
12 Plaza Provision Co., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 49 L.R.R.M. 1295 (1961).
ta Valley of Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 127 N.L.R.B. 785, 46 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1960).
14 supra note 12.
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majority was giving too much weight to company organization. The employer
agreed with member Rodgers.
In Burns Detective Agency" the Board held that a contract between
an employer and a union which represents both production-maintenance
employees and guards, but separates the guards into an appropriately differ-
ent unit, will bar an election. The Board read closely Section 9 (b) (3) which
prohibits both the determination of a unit composed of guards and other
employees as appropriate and the certification of a labor organization which
admits to membership, or is affiliated with an organization which admits to
membership, guards and non-guards. After determining the appropriateness
of the unit, the Board stated that the contract-bar rules apply regardless
of the absence of a certified bargaining agent. The Burns case overrules
Columbia-Southern Chemical Corp." Despite the fact that Section 9(b) (3)
defines a "guard" as one who:
. . . enforce[sj against employees and other persons rules to pro-
tect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons
on the employer's premises . . . ,
it is unclear whether the typical night watchman with janitorial duties is
included in the definition. Doubtlessly, the existence of this problem moved
the Board to invoke the contract-bar rule in the Burns case because that
rule tends to stabilize existing collective bargaining relationships. Here, as
in other representation cases, the new Board attempts to give appropriate
groups of employees maximum freedom to select their bargaining representa-
tives."
A paradoxical example of this policy is D. V. Display Corp." in which
the Board held that it will direct only one election in a group found appropri-
ate when a representation question involves a "historical" unit which the
incumbent seeks to enlarge by adding to it previously unrepresented "fringe
group" employees. D. V. Display overrules Zia Co." which held that a
group of previously unrepresented employees which did not comprise an
appropriate unit had the right to determine their inclusion in the existing
unit. The Zia rule tended to perpetuate the existence of inappropriate units,
a practice not in conformity with the statutory direction to determine ap-
propriate units.
A further example is Crumley Hotel, Inc.20 in which the new Board
reversed the old on reconsideration of the same case. The new Board de-
termined that where a hotel belongs to a multi-employer restaurant-hotel
bargaining unit which covers certain types of employees common to both
15 Wm. J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 49 L.R.R.M.
1145 (1961).
18 110 N.L.R.B. 1189, 35 L.R.R.M. 1212 (1954).
17 Cf. American Cyanamid case, supra note 4, Felix Half and Brother, supra
note 6, and Quaker City Life, supra note 8.
18 134 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 49 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1961).
19 108 N.L.R.B. 1134, 34 L.R.R.M 1133 (1954).
20 134 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 49 L.R.R.M. 1095 (1961), reversing 131 N.L.R.B. No. 20,
47 L.R.R.M. 1613 (1961).
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hotels and restaurants, unrepresented hotel employees need not be placed
in a multi-employer unit. The Board concluded that there was no bargaining
history to warrant a different result. The Board distinguished this case
from Los Angeles Stetter Hilton2 ' which held that the appropriate unit for
the unrepresented employees was a multi-employer unit because the employer
bargained with his represented employees as part of a multi-employer unit.
The Ballentine Packing Co. decision22 seems contrary to these decisions.
There the Meat Cutters sought to represent all 135 production and main-
tenance employees as well as 12 truck drivers whom the Teamsters sought to
represent. The Board directed separate elections in the production and
maintenance unit, and in the truck drivers unit, after determining that the
truck drivers spent most of their time on the road and very little of their
time in the plant. The Board reasoned that, if the Meat Cutters appeared
on the truck drivers' ballot, support might be diverted from the Team-
sters, and the Meat Cutters' campaign among the truck drivers might cause
it to lose support among the production-maintenance unit. Since the unit of
truck drivers was appropriate and since their interests were not closely allied
with the production-maintenance workers there was no objection to their
remaining unrepresented.
Ballentine overruled American Linen Supply Co. 23 which had held that,
because of the differences in duties among the company's production-
maintenance crew, the driver-salesmen and the transport drivers, the
latter group formed an appropriate unit at each plant; but if the ma-
jority of any group of driver-salesmen and transport drivers did not vote for
the Teamsters, that group would be included in the production-maintenance
group and their votes pooled. Only the Teamsters appeared on the drivers'
ballot.
Even in Ballentine, which does not permit pooling of votes, the object
is to give an appropriate group of employees a greater opportunity to select
a bargaining agent of their choice. The Board limits on pooling are imposed
only to prevent undue confusion.
In Paragon Products Corp. 24 the new Board altered the contract-bar
rule to state:
. . . only those contracts containing a union security provision
which is clearly unlawful on its face or which has been found to be
unlawful in an unfair labor practice proceeding may not bar a
representation petition.
21 129 N.L.R.B. 1349, 47 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1961).
22 132 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 48 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961). This case is consistent with
the new Board's opinion in American Cyanamid, supra note 4.
23 129 N.L.R.B. 993, 47 L.R.R.M. 1117 (1960).
24 134 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 49 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1961). The union security clause
herein failed to mention that present employees were allowed thirty days in which to
join the union, and it was alleged that there were present employees who were denied
the thirty day grace period. To determine the question would require a hearing. Con-
tracts containing ambiguous but not clearly unlawful union security provisions will
bar representation petitions in the absence of some other determination of illegality,
ruled the Board.
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The old Board held that any union security clause which differed from its
sample union security clause would not bar a representation petition by
another union.23 The new Board believed that the old rule had been disap-
proved by the Supreme Court and that the rule had had an unsettling effect
on established collective bargaining units."
Because the period between petitions for elections and the elections
themselves has been greatly shortened through the delegation of representa-
tion cases to the Regional Directors, the Board has modified the Woolworth
rule27 to state that the date on which the petition was filed will be the cut-off
time for asserting allegedly objectionable conduct as an unfair labor prac-
tice." Conduct after the cut-off date which tends to prevent a free election
will be considered grounds for objection to the election. The Board decided,
in the interest of fairness, to apply this rule only prospectively.
SECONDARY BOYCOTT
Section 8(b) (4) proscriptions limit union picketing in a wide variety
of situations often distinguishable in name only. Section 8(b) (4) (B) and
(C) alone have given rise to the terms "Primary Picketing," "Common Situs
Picketing," and "Ambulatory Situs Picketing." Each of these has tended to
spawn a separate set of rules. Recently, however, the lines of separation have
blurred. For example, the Moore Dry Dock case with its standards for
ambulatory situs picketing, tended to become the law until May, 1961, when
the Supreme Court complained that the old Board was applying its
standards too rigidly. 30 Moore Dry Dock is not the law, said the Court,
rather the Board must look to the statute. This article will not attempt
to untangle the maze of rules which have grown up around the different
26 Keystone Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 880, 43 L.R.R.M.
1251 (1959), revising former opinion, appearing in 42 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1958).
26 The Supreme Court in NLRB v, News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961),
which upheld the legality of so-called "deferral clauses" not expressly disclaiming
all prohibited objects, quoted with approval a court of appeals which stated "In the
absence of provisions calling for explicitly illegal conduct, the contract cannot be held
illegal because it failed affirmatively to disclaim all illegal objectives." The Board fol-
lowed this reasoning in Paragon Products. Another result of News Syndicate and
its companion case, ITU v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705 (1961), was the American Broadcasting
Co. case, 134 N.L.R.B. No, 148, 49 L.R.R.M. 1365 (1961), which overruled an earlier
unreported decision. The old Board had ruled that "deferral clauses" are to be ignored
in considering whether a union security clause violated § 8(a) (3) and therefore was
not a bar to a representation petition. The new Board ruled that the ITU and News
Syndicate cases held that "deferral clauses" must be considered in applying the "contract
bar" rules. Both the old and new Boards agreed that a representation hearing is
neither the time nor the place to determine the legality of a union security clause.
27 F. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1446, 34 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1954). It was
there held that a union which goes ahead with an election when there is employer
misconduct either after execution of the consent election agreement or in a contested
case after issuance of the decision and direction of election, does not waive its right
to assert the employer's misconduct as grounds for setting aside the election.
Ideal Electric & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 49 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1961).
29 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 92 N.L.R.B, 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
80 Local 761 Intl Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
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types of picketing. It appears that the distinctions which can be drawn be-
tween the cases are often insubstantial, but the distinctions are always present.
The old Board had held, prior to the effective date of the 1959 amend-
ments to 8(b) (4), that a union's picketing of a neutral employer's place of
business when there were no employees of the primary employer at the site
or when there were primary employer sites open for picketing was an
8(b) (4) (i) violation 3 1 The Board reasoned that such activity, even when
unaccompanied by interference with deliveries or work stoppages or refusals
to handle the products of the primary employers, invites the employees of
the secondary employer to unite with the pickets regardless of the literal
appeal of the signs and handbills. Although the statute was amended in
1959 to permit publicity other than picketing, the old Board did not alter
its rulings in this important area." These holdings were not being enforced
by the courts which read the amended law differently than did the Board."
In Lohman Saks Co." the new Board gave meaning to the 8(b) (4)
publicity proviso. Lohman, a wholesale distributor, was struck by the
Teamsters after collective bargaining failed to produce agreement. The union
informed several of Lohman's customers that they would be handbilled
if they did not cease buying from Lohman. Those firms which refused to
cooperate were visited by union members who distributed handbills which
stated the nature of the dispute with Lohman and which requested public
boycott of those items bought from Lohman. The new Board held that
the legislative history compels the conclusion that "mere handbilling is not
picketing but is embraced by the term publicity which is protected by the
proviso."35
The Lohman case has now become part of Board law. In Schepps
Grocery Co." the union seeking to gain public support for its strike against
81 Brewery & Beverage Drivers Union (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works,
Inc.), 107 N.L.R.B. 299, 33 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1953), which found an 8(b) (4)(A) violation
when a union striking for recognition picketed at the neutral employer's place of busi-
ness only when the primary employer's trucks were making deliveries. NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), reversed the court of
appeals and enforced a Board order directing the cessation of picketing at a common
situs when the union picketed the construction site in protest against the employment
of non-union electrical workers an the job. Picketing, according to Minneapolis House
Furnishing, infra note 47, is patrolling with a sign.
32 Hod Carriers Union (Calumet Contractors Ass'n), 130 N.L.R.B. 78, 47 L.R.R.M.
1253 (1960) and Local 261, United Wholesale and Warehouse Employees (Perfection.
Mattress and Spring Co.) 129 N.L.R.B. 1014, 47 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1960), reversed
by the new Board, 134 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 49 L.R.R.M. 1297 (1961).
33 Wholesale Employees, Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d 824, 46 L.R.R.M. 2554
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
34 Local 537, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429
(1961).
35 Supra note 34. The handbills were distributed outside of two drug stores.
They stated: "The cigars, cigarettes, tobacco and candies on sale in this store are
distributed by Lohman" and urged "don't purchase any cigars, cigarettes, or candies
in this store." The union did delete mention of any items which did not come from
Lohman upon notice that their list was inaccurate.
36 Local 968, Teamsters Union, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 49 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1961).
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the grocery wholesaler distributed handbills in front of the stores of Schepps'
customers which explained the nature of the dispute and requested public
boycott of goods sold by Schepps. The Board agreed that doubtlessly an
object of the handbilling was to force Schepps' customers, both direct and
indirect, to stop dealing with Schepps, but the Board held that under the
8(b) (4) proviso the union had the right to inform the public of the nature
of its dispute with Schepps.
In another case the Board relied on the Lohman rationale to hold that
handbilling at the business location of the primary employer's customer was
permissible." The handbills had stated the nature of the dispute and re-
quested that the public not purchase products distributed by the wholesaler.
In all of these cases the Board gave the 8(b)(4) publicity proviso
meaningful interpretation. The Board held that, regardless of the "induce-
ment and encouragement" effect of the handbills, if the literal appeal is to
the public and other evidence of impermissible objects is absent, then the
publicity proviso protects the activity. 38
The Board has not been blind to the fact that while the literal appeal
of the handbills may be permissible, threatening use of this weapon
combined with a threat to picket may be an unfair labor practice." Yet in
three cases the Board has held that the union has the right to warn
customers of the primary employer that handbilling will occur if the
customers refuse to cooperate with the union. 4° Thus far the union is
treated as merely informing the secondary employer that it intends to
exercise its legal rights if it does not obtain favorable action.
Middle South Broadcasting Co.41 (WOGA), in addition to presenting
the new Board with its first ambulatory situs case, raised serious questions
under the 8(b) (4) publicity proviso. In addition to picketing, the union,
in the course of an economic dispute with the employer, caused to be
published, circulated and mailed to union members, firms advertising on
WOGA and the public, leaflets requesting the public to cease patronizing
named firms still advertising on WOGA. The leaflet was accompanied by a
two-page pamphlet which explained the nature of the dispute between the
union and management. Two months later the union circulated another
37 Local 848, Wholesale Delivery Drivers' Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B.
No. 152, 49 L.R.R.M. 1028 (1961). A union picketed the primary employer, a whole-
saler, and after an appropriate warning to retailers who purchased from the primary
employer, handbilled those who refused to cease dealing with Servette. As a result of
the handbilling some market managers refused to permit the stocking of products
sold by Servette.
38 E.g., Schepps Grocery Co., supra note 36.
" Cf. Local 886, General Drivers Union (Stephens Co.) 133 N.L.R.B. No. 134,
49 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1961), which seems to indicate that the form of the threat to
handbill may be important.
40 In the Lohman Saks, supra note 34, Schepps Grocery, supra note 36, and
Servette cases, supra note 37, the Board considered the form of the warning of hand-
billing and, in each case, concluded that the warning did not constitute threats or
coercion within the meaning of 8(h) (4)(ii).
41 Local 662, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 133 N .L.R.B. No. 165, 49 L.R.R.M.
1043 (1961). Cf. page 500 infra.
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leaflet very much the same as the first. It is noteworthy that the first
leaflet was addressed "To our friends in THE CHATTANOOGA LABOR
MOVEMENT," while the second was addressed to "Chattanooga Area
Union Members, Their Families and Friends . . . . )Y42
The Board found the circulation of the leaflets protected by the 8(b) (4)
publicity proviso. The Board determined that the legislative history
indicates the publicity proviso was intended to permit a boycott of the
secondary employer's entire business and not merely a product boycott.
Although the 8(b) (4) publicity proviso permits publicity concerning
"product or products" only, the Board, in concluding that the radio station
produces a product, quoted the Lohman case to the effect that:
.. . labor is the prime requisite of one who produces and therefore
an employer who applies his labor to a product whether of an
abstract or physical nature or in the initial or intermediate stages
of the marketing of the product is one of the producers of the
product."
The Board was influenced in this determination by the fact that advertising,
by enlarging the public demand, contributes materially to the value of
the products advertised. Member Rodgers, in addition to dissenting on the
Board's handling of the ambulatory situs questions, was positive that the
radio station did not produce a "product" within the meaning of the act.
The old Board, in Carolina Lumber Co.," held that the term "any
individual" in the 8(b) (4) (i) proscription included any supervisor be-
longing to the rank and file employees' union or who once belonged to the
rank and file employees' union and was still sympathetic to it. The Board
reasoned that if the term "any individual" included laborers, supervisors and
management the enaction of the 8(b) (4) (ii) proscriptions was pointless.
Because Congress does not pass pointless legislation, the Board concluded
42 Since the leaflets were addressed primarily to organized labor and its friends
it is inferable that the leaflets were attempts to induce or encourage union men to
engage in refusals to work with an 8(b) (4) (B) objective.
43 Supra note 34.
44 Local 505, Teamsters Union, 130 N.L.R.B. 1438, 47 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1961).
When the struck employer delivered lumber to a construction site the strikers asked
the carpenters on the job, "Are you going to use the material ? If you do, our jobs is
[sic] sunk." When the carpenters used the lumber the strikers told the foreman in
charge of moving and handling the lumber at the construction site, "You know it's
wrong to handle that flooring. You will bust our union if you handle it." The fore-
man ordered the carpenters not to handle the lumber until he checked with the union.
The union directed use of the lumber. On another construction site the strikers in-
formed a project supervisor of the strike. The project supervisor, who directed all
work at the site from his field office and who had charge of all men on the job, spoke
to the job's union business agent who said that he preferred that the lumber not be
used. The supervisor then refused to use the lumber stating that he "didn't want
any part of somebody else's union problems." The Board held that there was an
8(b) (4) (i)(B) violation in inducing the foreman, but that there was no 8(b)(4)(i)(B)
violation in inducing the project supervisor.
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that the term "any individual" included only rank and file employees 45 and
some part of the supervisory force. The new Board has followed the reasoning
of Carolina Lumber in several later cases and has given the case greater
meaning. The earliest of the new Board decisions on this point held that
a partner of one motor carrier, the president of another motor carrier,
supervisors of a motor carrier's shipping and routing department, and an
agent of another motor carrier acknowledged by all parties to be an in-
dependent contractor were not "any individuals" within the meaning of
8(b) (4) (i)." The Board ruled that those above the first rank of super-
vision or whose jobs spontaneously identify them with management in
their relations with the outside world are not included in the class of persons
whom it is improper to induce or encourage. The Board stated that place-
ment of a person induced or encouraged within the scope of "any individual"
would depend on a case to case assessment of the relevant factors.
In Minneapolis House Furnishing Co. 47 the new Board held that a store
manager, a store sales manager and other unnamed supervisors were not
"any individuals" within the meaning of the act. The Board reasoned that,
since such supervisory personnel had actual or apparent authority to deter-
mine the purchasing or selling policies of their respective stores without
referring the matter to supervisors, they were managerial employees whose
interests were clearly not allied with those of the rank and file employees.
Yet in the Lohman case when the trial examiner found the purchasing
agent of a drug store chain, the drug department manager of another chain,
and the area merchandizing supervisor of the same chain to be "any
individuals" within the meaning of the act, the new Board accepted that
unchallenged finding." But the Board noted that it did not necessarily
agree with the finding. A later case ruled that retail market managers are
not included within the scope of "any individual."'"
45 See Local 299, Int'l Sheet Metal Workers (S. M. Kisner & Sons), 134 N.L.R.B.
No. 110, 49 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1961).
46 Local 294, Int'l lihd. of Teamsters (Van Transp. Lines, Inc.), 131 N.L.R.B. No.
42, 48 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1961). The union called a strike against Van for refusing to honor
an arbitration award, To bring more pressure on Van, the union sought to obtain the
cooperation of Van's customers. Some of the persons not included in the the term
"any individual" complied with the union request. See 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 546.
47 Local 61, Upholsterers Union, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1961). Here
the Board held that picketing of retail stores does not induce or encourage the named
supervisors to cease performing services or to engage in work stoppages. Yet the
Board did find that the picketing was impermissible on other grounds which will be
discussed later in this article.
48 Supra note 34. Here the trial examiner determined that the appeals to the
aforementioned managers constituted an inducement not to perform services they
were hired to perform. Apparently the trial examiner took the view that these par-
ticular persons could not perform their jobs if they refused to handle Lohman's goods.
The case does not include enough facts to determine whether there is any basis in fact
for such a finding. But even if there were, it is unlikely that the Board will follow
a similar line of reasoning in view of the Servette decision.
43 Supra note 37. In that case, the managers were empowered to determine
whether to continue doing business with Servette. The Board ruled flatly that even
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One of the most difficult questions raised under 8(b) (4) is where may
a striking union picket. At one time the answer could be found by applying
rigid rules; in fact, the classification of the picketing determined its permis-
sibility. Not so today. The new Board, under heavy prodding from the
courts, has revised the rules so that mere classification does not determine
the permissibility of the picketing. The same general classifications still
seem to be helpful, at least for the purposes of discussion: primary picketing
which presents the difficult separate gate problem; common situs picketing
which presents the question of union objective; ambulatory situs picketing
(today apparently including picketing of primary employer's delivery
trucks at delivery sites); and secondary boycott picketing which involves all
other types of 8(b) (4) picketing violations, but is characterized by the
absence of the primary employer or any of his working employees from the
picket site.
Primary Picketing
In 1949 the Board held that picketing a separate gate used by con-
struction company employees erecting an addition to the primary em-
ployer's plant on land contiguous to the main plant was not an 8(b) (4) (A)
violation." The Board relied heavily on the fact that the strikers told the
construction workers they could pass through the picket line if they so
desired and that construction workers stated that as "good union men" they
would not cross through a picket line. Further, the Board noted that the
signs were directed at the primary employer and not at the construction
company, and the primary employer's employees were able to enter the
premises through the construction company gate.
This doctrine was seemingly overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp." in
which the old Board held that picketing of a newly opened gate marked
"contractors only" at a site contiguous to a manufacturing plant was an
8(b)(4)(i)(A) violation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
enforced the cease picketing order, stating:
[t] here must be a separate gate, marked and set apart from other
gates; the work done by the men who use the gate must be un-
related to the normal operations of the employer, and the work
must be of a kind that would not, if done when the plant were en-
gaged in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing those opera-
tions.52
Shortly after this opinion by the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
was ,faced with a similar problem in the Electrical Workers case." The
though some of the managers refused to permit the stocking of products sold by
Servette none of the managers by so doing "refused to perform services."
54:1 United Elec. Workers (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 24 L.R.R.M. 1424
(1949).
51 United Steelworkers (Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. 1367, 45
L.R.R.M. 1474 (1960).
52 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 591, 48 L.R.R.M. 2106 (2d Cir. 1961).
55 Local 761 Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
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union struck General Electric when unable to settle a grievance. The
union picketed a gate marked "GATE 3-A FOR EMPLOYEES OF
CONTRACTORS ONLY—G. E. EMPLOYEES USE OTHER GATES."
The Court remanded the case to the Board for further consideration on
the ground that the use of Gate 3-A was a mingled one because the in-
dependent contractors' employees did conventional maintenance work neces-
sary for the normal operation of General Electric. The Court found the
above quoted statement of the Second Circuit controlling.
It seems apparent that the old Board overruled the Ryan case in the
Phelps Dodge case. The Supreme Court in the Electrical Workers case
reproved the Board for its mechanical handling of the cases. The Court
suggested that Moore Dry Dock, upon which the Board had relied heavily,
was not the law, rather the statute contained the law to be applied. It
would appear that these separate gate picketing problems are still open
questions.
Ambulatory Situs Picketing
In the Moore Dry Dock" case in 1950, the Board laid down a series
of rules which have since been applied to nearly every type of picketing
situation. The Board held that picketing of an ambulatory situs when it
comes to rest is permissible if: (a) the picketing is limited to the time when
the situs is present; (b) during the period of the picketing the situs was
engaged in its normal business; (c) the pickets get as close to the situs as
they reasonably can; and (d) the conduct of the pickets indicates that the
dispute is solely with the primary employer.
In Washington Coca Cola" the Board ruled that when a union failed
to picket the company warehouse but picketed the employer's delivery truck
at delivery sites within the Moore Dry Dock rules, the delivery site picketing
was a violation of 8(b) (4) because the union had available another site
(the warehouse) which would enable it to properly air its dispute. The
rationale was not approved by the reviewing court. In Campbell Coal," which
presented facts substantially identical with Washington Coca Cola, the Board
followed the latter case. The court of appeals which reviewed the case
remanded it for further consideration by the Board. 57 On remand the
Board found the picketing prohibited but on the grounds that the pickets
54 Sailors' Union of the Pat., AFL, 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
The object picketed was a ship of foreign registry. The Phopho was training her
new Greek crew (which replaced an American crew) at the Moore Dry Dock site in
addition to undergoing repairs there.
55 Brewery & Beverage Drivers Union, 107 N.L.R.B. 299, 33 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1953).
56 Sales Drivers (Associated Gen. Contractors), 110 N.L.R.B. 2192, 35 L.R.R.M.
1369 (1954). Campbell operated ready-mix concrete plants. Its drivers picked up the
concrete at a Campbell plant and delivered it to construction sites. The drivers spent
approximately 25% of their working day enroute, 25% at the Campbell plants, and
50% at the construction sites.
57 Sales Drivers, Local 859 v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956). The court of appeals set aside the Board order because the Board
failed to consider what the objective of the picketing was as required by as yet
unamended 8(b) (4)(A).
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at the delivery site did nothing to confine the dispute to the primary
employer." The court of appeals enforced the Board order by the narrowest
of margins."
The new Board faced its first ambulatory situs picketing case in
Middle South Broadcasting Co. (WOGA).°° When negotiations for a new
contract broke down, the union picketed the building in which the station
was located. On January 30, 1960, WOGA had a remote broadcast from
the premises of a local auto dealer. The broadcast lasted two hours, but
the employees left the remote site for two five-minute news broadcasts which
originated at the station. During the entire two hour period the union had
no pickets at the station, but it did have two pickets patrolling the auto
dealer's store carrying the following sign: "WOGA UNFAIR LOCAL 662
DO NOT PATRONIZE LOCAL UNION 662, I.B.E.W." On May 14,
1960, the station took its newly acquired musicmobile (mobile radio station)
back to the same auto dealer. The musicmobile was located on the street
parallel to the curb and directly in front of the entrance to the auto
dealer's showroom. While the broadcast was in progress the union had two
pickets patrolling and one of them carried the same sign used earlier. During
the first half hour the pickets patrolled on the sidewalk between the music-
mobile and the showroom, but then for the remaining one and one-half
hours they patrolled the street side of the musicmobile. The union had no
pickets at the station's permanent location during the remote broadcast. On
both these occasions WOGA publicized the remote broadcasts and requested
that the public attend. There were no work stoppages by the auto dealer's
employees, and there was no interference with deliveries. It was stipulated
that WOGA regularly conducts about ten mobile broadcasts per week. The
Board found that the picketing was permissible under the Moore Dry Dock
rules after making a point -by -point comparison. The Board's opinion does
not indicate whether the Board even considered the continuation of picketing
during the.ten minute absence of WOGA employees who left the ambulatory
site to make the news broadcasts. After further reviewing the facts the
Board distinguished Washington Coca Cola on the basis that:
... with advance publicity to the public to that effect, the primary
employer moves its "regular" place of business to secondary sites
for substantial and frequent periods of time, and that during such
periods the Union was and is entitled ... to picket the primary
employer at such sites in order to publicize its primary dispute to
the public, because during such periods it can "adequately" publi-
cize its dispute to the public only at these "roving" [sic] places
of business.°'
" Sales Drivers, Local 859, 116 N.L.R.B. 1020, 38 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1956).
59 Truck Drivers, Local 728 v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 958 (1958). With one judge dissenting the court of appeals was still doubtful
about the Board's application of the act on these facts, but resolved the doubt in
favor of the Board.
lin Supra note 41.
61 Ibid.
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Members Rodgers and Leedom joined in dissent on the basis that
Moore Dry Dock was not applicable to "common situs picketing" and that
the correct rule to be applied was that of Washington Coca Cola even though
it had not been approved by all of the courts which had passed upon it."
Common Situs Picketing
In 1951 the Supreme Court upheld a Board determination that picketing
a construction site in protest of the use of non-union men was an 8(b) (4) (A)
violation." The Court viewed the notice of picketing given Denver
Building Trades Council by the Council's Board of Business Agents as a
"signal in the nature of an order to the members of the affiliated unions
to leave the job and remain away until otherwise ordered." 04 The Court
was convinced that there was an object of forcing and requiring the general
contractor to cease doing business with the non-union subcontractor since
those two parties had a contract.
The old Board had so amplified this ruling that almost any picketing
at a common situs became impermissible under the combined application
of the Moore Dry Dock," Washington Coca Cola" and Denver Build-
ing Trades Council" rules. The Board had ruled that failure to follow
Moore Dry Dock to the letter was an 8 (b) (4) violation, but even if
Moore were followed there was still an 8(b) (4) violation in a Washington
Coca Cola situation. If the union picketing was still permissible then the
Board would rule that there was picketing for a proscribed object because
picketing at the common site necessarily induces and encourages the em-
ployees of other employers to strike.
For example, when the Hod Carriers Union patrolled the work site
of any employer whose employees had a certified bargaining representative
carrying signs and distributing handbills which advised the public that
unqualified personnel were performing the work and that union pay and
work standards were not being met, the old Board found an 8 (b) (4) (C)
62 The Washington Coca Cola rule has been a subject of controversy among the
courts of appeal, When the First Circuit in the NLRB v. United Steelworkers case,
250 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1957), enforced a Board order based on the Washington Coca
Cola rule, it noted that such action was in agreement with that taken by the District
of Columbia Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. But the District of Columbia Circuit which
enforced the Board order in the Washington Coca Cola case, Brewery and Beverage
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955), later in the Campbell Coal
case, supra note 57, denied enforcement to a Board order based on the Washington
Coca Cola rule. There the court remanded the case for a finding as to the objective
of the picketing.
63 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The
general contractor, noose & Litner, had a subcontract with Gould & Preisner, a non-
union firm, to perform electrical work on a construction site in Denver. The Council
paid a picket to patrol the construction site after informing Doose and Litner that
union men could not work on the job with non-union men.
64 Id. at 678.
65 Supra note 54.
66 Supra note 55.
67 Supra note 63.
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violation." The old Board found inducement and encouragement of the em-
ployees at the work site regardless of the literal appeal of the signs; it
further concluded, union statements to the contrary notwithstanding, that
the purpose of the picketing was to obtain recognition. The Board's ra-
tionale was that the objects sought by the union were those normally obtained
only through the collective bargaining process. The new Board on recon-
sideration of the case dismissed the charge stating:
Section 8(b) (4) (C), as we read it, does not contain a broad pro-
scription against all types of picketing. It forbids only picketing
with the objective of obtaining "recognition and bargaining." On
the record before us, Respondent clearly disclaimed such an objec-
tive and sought only to eliminate subnormal working conditions
from area considerations. As this objective could be achieved with-
out the Employer either bargaining with or recognizing Re-
spondent, we cannot reasonably conclude that Respondent's objec-
tive in picketing . . . was to obtain recognition or bargaining. 69
The Hod Carriers case overruled sub silentio Lewis Food" which had held
that striking or picketing for an objective normally obtained through rec-
ognition and collective bargaining requires a finding that the striking or
picketing is for recognition and bargaining. Lewis Food was expressly over-
ruled by Fanelli Ford." which presented an 8(b) (7) (C) problem.
Shortly after the Hod Carriers case, the new Board decided Plauche"
which had facts strikingly similar to those in Denver Building Trades
Council. U. S. Tire Engineers, Inc. desired to have Lake City Electric, a
non-union firm, do some electrical work on its premises. Fearing union
trouble, the job was awarded to Plauche Electric, which had a settlement
agreement with the union, on the basis of the Lake City estimates. The
contract was on a cost (including the labor of the Lake City partners who
were hired by Plauche as temporary employees) plus profit basis. After
work began according to the agreement, the union picketed U. S. Tire
carrying signs which stated that Plauche was the sole disputant. There was
no picketing at Plauche's nearby office to which Plauche employees normally
68 Hod Carriers Union (Calumet Contractors Ass'n), 130 N.L.R.B. 78, 47 L.R.R.M.
1253 (1961), reversed, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 48 L.R.R.M. 1667 (1961). While the
signs and leaflets were clearly drafted with the 8(b) (4) proviso in mind, the picket
would remain in his car until people approached the work site and then he would get
out to patrol.
62 Hod Carriers Union, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 48 L.R.R.M. 1667 (1961).
70 115 N.L.R.B. 890, 37 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1956). The closest reading of the ruling
in this case is that striking or picketing to obtain reinstatement of a discharged employee
is for the purpose of compelling recognition and bargaining on that issue. The rationale
of the ruling was that since reinstatement is normally achieved only after recognition
and bargaining that recognition and bargaining must be the objectives of the striking or
picketing. It seems obvious that the old Board would have regarded the Lewis Food
decision as controlling in the Hod Carriers case.
Ti Local 259, UAW, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 49 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1961).
72 Local 861, Elec. Workers (Plauche Electric, Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. No. 41,
49 L.R.R.M. 1446 (1962).
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reported before going to the job site. The Lake City partners posing as
employees of Plauche reported to Plauche's office only on one day.
The Board ruled that the place of the picketing was only one circum-
stance to be considered in determining the object of the picketing. Plauche's
office was not the sole permissible situs for publicity of the dispute. The
Board expressly overruled Washington Coca Cola to the extent of its
inconsistency and applied the Moore Dry Dock formula. The application
of the Moore Dry Dock formula was not rigid because the Board found the
picketing permissible although the union had picketed when the Lake City
partners went to lunch and took coffee breaks. 73
Secondary Boycott Picketing
One of the few areas of agreement between the new and the old
Boards is the rule that peaceful picketing for an objective proscribed by
8 (b) (4) constitutes restraint or coercion within the meaning of 8(b) (4) (ii) . 74
Minneapolis House Furnishing" applied this rule to the picketing of a
retail store by union members employed by a local manufacturer whose
products were not sold by the retailer. There were two union men at the
retailer's premises one of which patrolled with two signs, while the other
distributed handbills. The handbill contained a more complete explanation
of the nature of the dispute and the type of action which the union was
requesting.70 The Board separated the handbilling from the picketing and
ruled that the latter was activity proscribed by 8(b) (4) (ii) although there
were neither work stoppages nor delivery interruptions. The Board's findings
were unusual in that it found: (1) that the primary dispute was with the
non-local manufacturers who sold to the retailers; and (2) that the store
owners were coerced and restrained; but (3) that the store employees who
had a certified bargaining representative but no contract were not induced
or encouraged. Under the 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) proscriptions if this picketing were
primary it would have been permissible. But the Board, regarding the
picketing as economic blackmail, apparently found that the primary dispute
was with the non-local manufacturers in order to find the picketing imper-
missible. To find that activity coercive to management is not even en-
couraging to employees is anomalous, but is perhaps an expedient way to
73 The Board found that the maintenance of picketing while Lake City men
were having lunch and coffee constituted a de minimus variation from Moore Dry Dock.
Moore Dry Dock must be applied with common sense. It is noteworthy that the Moore
Dry Dock rule has been applied to a situation far removed from its origin. The rule
is presently applied in nearly every type of picketing problem.
" Cf. Local 1140, Hod Carriers Union (Gilmore Const. Co.), 127 N.L.R.B.
541, 46 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1960) and Local 261, Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union
(Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.), 129 N.L,R.B. 1014, 47 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1960).
75 Supra note 47.
76 One sign read: "Help us keep our jobs—Buy mattresses made locally by
Upholsterers Local 61 AFL-CIO." The handbill contained a short essay on the
importance of buying locally made products, and then listed local manufacturing firms.
The handbill concluded by asking the reader to ask for locally made products when
shopping. 48 L.R.R.M. at 1303.
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avoid casting doubt on such cases as Calumet" and Plauche78 which hold
that picketing of a common situs is not a per se inducement or encourage-
ment of a secondary employer's employees.
In Stephens Co.," after the union and the company had failed to
agree on contract terms, the union sent letters to seventeen of Stephens'
customers. The letters advised the customers of the nature of the dispute
and stated that if their aid were not forthcoming
. . . it would be necessary for us to inform all union members and
the public in general of the facts in this matter. This we intend to
do by the use of pickets at the place of business of the customers
of Stephens Co.
About two and one-half weeks later the union sent to the same firms a
second letter, substantially the same as the first, but which added that if
there were any picketing it would be conducted within the rules set out in
a line of cases beginning with Moore Dry Dock. The new Board ruled that
the first letter constituted a clear threat of picketing with an object of
forcing or requiring other employers to cease doing business with Stephens.
The first letter did state that the union intended to do everything in its
power which was lawful to further its cause, but the Board paid no attention
to this statement. The second , letter was not an unfair labor practice
because it indicated an intent to stay clearly within the law.
Mere threats to picket or picketing when the primary employer is not
in the vicinity is a violation of 8(b) (4) (ii) because the object is
coercion of the secondary employer. 80 The only time when picketing of
Stephens' customers could conceivably be permissible in view of the
Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.' decision is when Stephens' trucks are
making deliveries. In addition the only difference between the letters was
that the second referred to the Moore Dry Dock rule which at best only
permits picketing of the secondary site when the primary employer's equip-
ment is present. Because of the permissibility of the second letter in
Stephens and because of the holding in Plauche the implication is that
picketing of the primary employer's delivery trucks at delivery sites is
permissible since it can be properly restricted to have its major effect on
the primary employer.
In view of these cases, the Ryan82 case, impliedly overruled by the old
Board is now the Board rule. If the Board will permit picketing of a
secondary employer's place of business when a primary employer's delivery
truck is present, it will permit picketing of a separate gate on a primary
employer's premises if the picketing is limited in its appeal to employees of
77 Supra note 69.
78 Supra note 72.
70 Local 886, Gen. Drivers Union, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 49 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1961).
80 Ibid.
81 Supra note 47.
82 Supra note 50.
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the primary employer. Of course, if the gate has a mingled use, the Supreme
Court has ruled that picketing is permissible."
RECOGNITIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
There is a paucity of 8(b) (7) cases because the section was first en-
acted in 1959. Yet there are 8(b) (4) (C) cases which have an impact on
8(b) (7). One of these, Lewis Food Co.," was expressly overruled by the
new Board in Fanelli Ford.85 Two of Fanelli's mechanics solicited members
for the union. When the union had an ostensible majority, it sought recogni-
tion from the employer who responded by firing one of the solicitors. When
the employer refused to discuss the discharge with the union, the union
paid one man to picket the service shop. The union later shifted the picket
to the area near Fanelli's showroom. The picket carried signs which charged
that Fanelli had committed an unfair labor practice and requested that the
public buy cars elsewhere. The union informed its members that the
picketing was only to secure the reinstatement of the discharged employee.
Furthermore, the union, which has a policy of not striking for recognition,
neither demanded recognition nor filed an unfair labor practice charge.
On these facts the Board found that the object of the picketing was
not forcing or requiring the employer to bargain with the union but was
to secure reinstatement of the discharged employee. Member Rodgers
dissented on the basis that he would not overrule the more realistic Lewis
Food case. The majority position is defensible because general counsel has
the burden of proof in unfair labor practice cases.
In furtherance of its new thinking in recognitional picketing
cases, the Board held that the fact that the picketing prior to the expira-
tion of the 30 day period was for recognition did not compel a finding that
subsequent picketing was for the same object." In that case the Teamsters,
after losing an election, settled unfair labor practice charges with the em-
ployer. At a post election meeting the union decided to picket Bachman as
remedial action but not to picket another employer whose employees also
rejected the union, although the circumstances surrounding both cases were
substantially the same. The union agent testified that he did not think that
Bachman would grant recognition to the union and that the purpose of the
picketing was to inform the public that the Teamsters lost the Bachman
election because of Bachman's unfair labor practices. The signs carried by
the pickets stated merely that Bachman had violated federal law by com-
mitting an unfair labor practice. 87 On these facts the Board found that the
83 Supra note 53.
84 Supra note 70. Lewis presented an 8(b)(4)(C) case in which the Board ruled
that striking or picketing to secure the reinstatement of a discharged employee had
as its objectives recognition and bargaining.
86 Supra note 71.
85 "General" Local 200, Teamsters Union (Bachman Furniture Co.), 134 N.L.R.B.
No. 54, 49 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1961).
87 The Board stated that the question is not whether the employer actually engaged
in the unfair labor practice charged by the signs and handbills but "whether the union
honestly and reasonably believed that the employer had engaged" in the misconduct
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picketing did not have as its object recognition or bargaining. Once again
the Board seemed persuaded that the General Counsel had failed to satisfy
his burden of proof. The Board has in both the 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7)
picketing cases required some affirmative showing that the union's objective
is impermissible. A mere reading of the signs or the handbills will not meet
the burden of proof in these cases. If the publicity provisos are to have any
meaning, the act must be interpreted as the Board is now interpreting it,
The Board found picketing for a proscribed object when it found an
8(b) (7) (B) violation on the following facts: it was certified on August 25
that the union lost the election held on August 18; on August 19 the
union changed its picket signs to read "This is a Non-Union Store—Irvins
Opposes Unions for its Employees—Please do not patronize." 88 The
union representative testified that the picketing before August 19 was
for recognition, but that the subsequent picketing was only to convey in-
formation to the public. The union representative claimed that the picketing
would be discontinued if the employer would: (1) assemble the employees;
(2) give them assurances that they have free choice in selecting a bargaining
representative; and (3) invite the union representative to address the em-
ployees. The picketing ceased on October 3 in response to an injunction
issued by a federal district court. The facts seemed so extreme that the
Board did not bother to discuss the improper objective factor in detail. The
Irvin case also ruled that there can be no finding of an 8(b) (7) (B) violation
until all challenges and objections have been disposed of, or until it has been
determined that a runoff election is not required. Stated another way, there
can be no finding of an 8(b) (7) (B) violation before the regional director
certifies that the election results are such that a new election is not re-
quired.89 If it is determined that there is an 8(b) (7) (B) violation, the
remedial order will require the cessation of all recognitions.' and/or organiza-
tional picketing for a period of twelve months after the date on which the
labor organization terminates its picketing activities either voluntarily or
involuntarily. Therefore the Board ordered the union not to picket Irvin
for 12 months after October 3 for an object proscribed by 8(b)(7)(B).
The Board treated this section of the act much like section 9(c) and in
so doing determined that the Congressional intent was to grant immunity
from the proscribed activity for a period of 12 months.
On February 20, 1961, the Board ruled on four 8(b) (7) complaints
finding violations in all of them." Exactly one year later the Board ruled
charged. Therefore if the union has an honest and reasonable belief that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice it has the right to conduct organizational picketing
at the employer's premises.
88 Local 692, Retail Store Employees Union (Irvin, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. No. 53,
49 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1961).
80 Ibid.
90 Local 840, Hod Carriers' Union (C. A. Blinne Constr. Co.), 130 N.L.R.B.
587, 47 L.R.R.M. 1318 (1961); Local 681, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union (Crown
Cafeteria), 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 47 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1961); Local 285, I.T.U. (Charlton
Press, Inc.), 130 N.L.R.B 558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1334 (1961); and Local 89, Hotel Sr
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on the same four cases on rehearing. Three of the cases reached different
results and all gave evidence of the new Board philosophy.9 '
In Blinne°2 three laborers and an engineer were employed on a project.
The union after signing the laborers as members demanded recognition.
Blinne destroyed the union majority by transferring one of the employees.
The union picketed in response to the transfer with several objectives, one of
which was recognition. The union then filed 8(a) (1),(2),(3) and (5)
charges. The regional director dismissed the 8(a)(2) and (5) charges after
the union had picketed for thirty days without filing a petition for recogni-
tion. The regional director found the other charges meritorious and subse-
quently approved the settlement agreement which the parties executed. The
old Board found a clear 8(b) (7) violation because the act requires the filing
of a petition within 30 days after the commencement of recognitional
picketing. The Board also noted that the only 10(1) exception is when
an 8(a) (2) charge is filed.
In Crown Cafeteria" management refused to hire through a union
hiring hall. The union commenced picketing to advise the public that
Crown was non-union and to request that the public not patronize Crown.
On some occasions the pickets carried signs stating that Crown "is attempt-
ing to break down our standard of wages, vacations, health and welfare,
workday, workweek, contracts as paid by over 600 union establishments.
Please do not patronize." For about four months the cafeteria had difficulty
obtaining supplies, but this situation was remedied by arranging all deliveries
before 11 A.M. when picketing commenced. The old Board found an
8(b) (7) (C) violation because the sole object of the union's picketing must
be informational. It was not enough if one of the objects was to convey
information. The union agent testified that the sole object was to get a union
hiring hall, which he admitted would eventually mean majority status and
recognition.
In the Stork Club 94 case, the company promptly fired any employees
who joined the union. When the union demand for their reinstatement was
refused, the union picketed with the usual "unfair" and "do not patronize"
signs. On January 1, 1960, the company filed 8(b) (7) (C) charges, and, on
January 15, the union dropped its demand for recognition. The post-
January 14th signs and leaflets stated that the union did not have a
contract with Stork, that Stork did not maintain union wage or working
standards and that Stork had discharged employees for joining the union.
The leaflet disclaimed recognition as an objective, terming it illegal. But
Restaurant Employees Union (Stork Club), 130 N.L.R.B. 543, 47 L.R.R.M. 1327
(1961).
fn The Board affirmed Blinne, 135 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 49 L.R.R.M. 1638 (1962);
and reversed Crown, 135 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 49 L.R.R.M. 1648 (1962), Charlton, 135
N.L.R.B. No. 123, 49 L.R.R.M. 1650 (1962) and Stork, 135 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 49
L.R.R.M. 1653 (1962).
22 Supra note 90.
42 Supra note 90.
94 Supra note 90.
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on five occasions in seven days Teamsters refused to cross the picket line
to make deliveries. The picketing through January 14 was admittedly
an 8(b) (7) violation, but the Board found that the picketing after that
date was also a violation, even if informational, because it had the effect
of inducing individuals not to deliver.
In the Charlton Press" case, all nine composing room employees who
had joined the union in early February were fired by early March after
being interrogated and threatened. The company refused to bargain with
the union which was greatly restricted in its scope of remedial activity
by its failure to comply with Sections 9(f), (g) and (h). A trial examiner's
finding of merit in the union's unfair labor practice charges was unchal-
lenged by management. The union, without filing a representation petition,
continued striking and picketing until the thirty-second day after the
effective date of the act. The old Board found an 8(b) (7) (C) violation
because the union failed to file a timely petition.
On rehearing of the BlinneD° case, the new Board found that the objec-
tive of the striking and picketing was recognition and bargaining and since
the union failed to file a timely petition it had violated 8(b) (7) (C). The
Board found no mandate in the statute to direct an election until the un-
fair labor practices charges are resolved. Thus it concluded that Congress
did not intend to change the Board procedure of not directing an election
until the resolution of the unfair labor practices. The Board further de-
termined that an unfair labor practice charge is not a defense to an
8(b)(7)(C) charge, but if the picketing were in protest of an employer
unfair labor practice the 8(b) (7) proscriptions would not apply. In foot-
note 24 to that Board opinion Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown
indicated that if a complaint under 8(a) (5) were filed a representation
petition need not be filed.
Members Rodgers and Leedom objected to the 8(a)(5) exception
noted in footnote 24. Member Fanning dissented in part and concurred
in part because in his opinion the union was faced with a Hobson's choice
under the Aeillo" doctrine. Fanning would have ruled that in the future
only meritorious 8(a)(5) charges would abrogate the need for filing a
representation petition under 8(b) (7). The battle lines drawn in the Blinne
case appear in the other three cases.
In Crown Cafeteria" the majority of the new Board directed dismissal
95 Supra note 90.
96 Supra note 91.
97 Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R,B. 1365, 35 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1954), stated that
a union whose claim of majority status is rejected by an employer may either file
an 8(a) (5) charge or a representation petition. The case held that a labor organization
which elected to proceed with a representation election with knowledge of employer
8(a) (5) violations may not, after losing the election, revert to the 8(a) (5) charges
as a means of establishing its majority status. The Board will not consider facts
which occurred before the election as grounds for finding an 8(a) (5) violation. The
Aiello rule has been extended to require a union to withdraw an 8(a)(5) or suffer
its dismissal, if it elects to process a representation petition. Cf. supra note 27.
98 Supra note 91.
508
STUDENT COMMENTS
of the 8(b) (7) charge on the basis of the Jenkins and Fanning dissent in
the original Crown case. The dissent took the position that purely in-
formational picketing is not proscribed by 8(b) (7). Mere delivery or work
stoppage is not enough to convert informational picketing into recognitional
picketing. The majority position apparently is that picketing which has
as its major objective the dissemination of information is permissible.
Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented on the basis that infor-
mational picketing may be conducted only when there is no independent
evidence of an unlawful objective and when there is no work stoppage.
The dissenters asserted that the majority is only reading the signs and
not looking at all of the union's conduct.
In Charlton Press" the majority used Blinne footnote 24 as the
governing principle. The majority ruled that when an 8(a)(5) charge is
filed there is no question of representation, and therefore a representation
petition is inappropriate. Since the Typographical Workers clearly had a
valid 8(a) (5) charge, the 8(b) (7) charge was dismissed. The Board was
impressed with Supreme Court dictam to the effect that the abolished
9(f),(g) and (h) penalties were to be the only penalties for failure to
comply with the three sections. The Board reasoned that if it found an
8(b)(7) violation it would be penalizing the union for failure to comply
with the abolished sections.
Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented on the basis that the separate
opinion in Blinne should be the law. The union picketed more than 30
days without filing a representation petition and therefore violated the
section. The dissent noted that section 10(1) prohibits the regional attor-
ney from seeking a temporary restraining order when an 8(b)(7) charge
had been filed if, but only if, it has been coupled with the filing of an
8(b) (2) charge; there is no such exception for an 8(a) (5) charge.'°'
In the Stork Clubm case the Board agreed that the picketing prior
to January 15 was illegal. In the period between Board rulings the
General Counsel has sought a temporary injunction against the union
picketing. A New York federal district court's ruling which granted the
temporary restraining order 101 was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.'" The court of appeals stated that the signs which
were permitted by the proviso cannot be the basis for the finding of the
99 Supra note 91.
100 UMW v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); and NLRB v. District 50,
UMW, 355 U.S. 453 (1958).
101 Section 10(1) states:
. . . or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining order under sec-
tion 8(b) (7) if a charge against the employer under section 8(a) (2) has been
filed and after preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe
that such charge is true . . . .
102 Supra note 91.
103 McLeod v. Local 89, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, 181 F. Supp.
742 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
104 McLeod v. Local 89, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 280 F.2d 760
(2d Cir. 1960).
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unfair labor practice. Mere desire to eliminate poor working conditions by
informational picketing is not an unfair labor practice even though such
objectives are normally obtained through the collective bargaining process.
Since both the Board and the court were faced with the same facts, the
Board concluded that it would be frivolous for it to find an unfair labor
practice. But the Board added that 8(b) (7) (C) does not prohibit picket-
ing whose object is neither recognition nor bargaining even when the effect
of the picketing is to induce persons not to perform services or not to
pick up or make deliveries, since that proviso did not establish a separate
unfair labor practice. The Board stated, however, that this ruling has no
application to 8(b) (4) cases.
Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented on the basis that picketing is
illegal when its effect is to interrupt deliveries or to cause work stoppages.
The Stork Club case is of little value as precedent. It does, however,
indicate why the Board was having so much trouble in getting some of its
earlier rulings accepted by the courts. The courts have generally rejected
findings of illegal conduct based merely on admittedly legal conduct. Of
course the Board could have treated the Stork Club facts differently than
did the federal district court and in so doing force the court of appeals to
reconsider the case. It would seem, however, that the Board probably
agreed with the reasoning of the court of appeals. 1 °5
105 There are a series of 9(c) (1)(B) cases which are of minor importance for
their alterations in that area and which have a slight bearing on 8(b)(7). In Normandin
Bros. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 48 L.R.R.M. 1224 (1961), the employer requested an
election in a unit of production-maintenance employees. The union, which earlier had
been the certified bargaining representative of the employees and had lost its majority
status, moved for dismissal of the petition. The union notified the company prior
to the filing of the petition that it was no longer interested in recognition and bargain-
ing but that it did intend to continue what it termed "informational picketing." The
union then picketed the employee service gate in the rear of the employer's premises
with a sign, addressed to the public, stating that Normandin's employees did not work
under union conditions and that Normandin did not have a contract with the union.
The Board directed an election after finding that the union's picketing of the employees'
gate indicated that it was interested in representing the employees. The Board dis-
counted the union's disclaimer. In Miratti's, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 48 L.R.R.M.
1407 (1961), the Board dismissed the employer's petition for a representation ejection.
There the union, which had represented the employees for three years, lost its majority
status. Three years later, after negotiations with the employer failed to resolve the
representation issues, the union informed Miratti's that it intended to inform the public
of the nature of the dispute. The union picketed Miratti's retail stores with signs
stating that the union did not seek recognition from Miratti's, but that the union
wanted the public to take its business to employers who did have contracts with the
union. The Board distinguished Normandin on the basis that there the picketing was
confined to the employee's entrance while here the picketing was confined to the em-
ployer's retail stores. The Board was willing to assume that the day before the
commencement of the picketing the union's object was recognition, but found the union
had made an effective disclaimer. Where there is such a disclaimer the Board announced
that it would closely scrutinize the union's conduct at the time of the disclaimer and
shortly thereafter. In another similar case, Andes Candies, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 65,
48 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1961), the employer had a candy plant and several retail stores in
the vicinity of the plant. From November, 1960, until May, 1961, union organizers (not
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AGENCY SHOP
On October 20, 1959,1 " the UAW asked General Motors to begin
bargaining on an agency shop provision for its Indiana employees." 1
General Motors refused on the grounds that such an agreement would
violate sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a)(3) of the act. The union filed 8(a) (5)
charges, and the case was heard under the following stipulations: (1) that
the case should be decided solely on the basis of federal law without resort
to the law of any state; (2) that no party was proceeding on the ground
that the proposed agency shop would violate Indiana's "Right-to-Work"
law; and (3) that no party was claiming that the existing collective
bargaining agreement barred the requested bargaining. The old Board
dismissed the complaint on the basis that such a provision would violate
section 8(a) (3). 1" On rehearing the new Board decided that the proposed
from the union which represented the employer's retail store employees) conducted an
organizational campaign at the factory entrance by handing out union literature and
seeking authorization cards. In December, 1960, the union informed the employer
that it did not claim to represent the factory employees, nor did it seek recognition,
but rather it was picketing the employer's retail stores to persuade the public to take
its business to those employers with which the union had a contract. The union picketed
the retail stores shortly before and after Christmas, Valentine's Day, Easter and
Mother's Day advising the public that the employer did not have a contract with the
union as did another named candy company. The signs asked the public to patronize
those candy companies which did have contracts with the union, The Board dismissed
the employer's representation petition on the basis of Miratti's, Inc.
Andes, Miratti and Normandin arise under section 9(c) (1) (B) of the act. That
section raises the question of whether an employer has been presented with a claim
to be recognized by a labor organization. If the employer has been so presented, the
Board must make a determination whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists; if it does a hearing is ordered.
Two of these cases represent the Board's administrative determination that a question
of representation does not exist. They do raise the question of the objective of the
union's picketing. But they do not raise the question in an 8(b)(7) context where
the General Counsel has the burden of proof, and where the consequence of a violation
is the termination of picketing for the proscribed object for a maximum of one year.
Crown and Stork reach the result they do because the General Counsel has the burden
of proof which he failed to satisfy.
100 This occurred after Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 159 N.E.2d 408
(Ind. App. 1959), in which it was held that the agency shop was a permissible form
of union security under Indiana's "Right-to-Work" law.
107 The proposed clause required each employee in Indiana to pay to the union,
as a condition of employment, a sum equal to the initiation fees and dues normally
imposed upon members of the union.
The national agreement had provided for a union shop and maintenance of mem-
bership except in those states where membership in a labor organization could not be a
condition of employment under state law.
108 General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 47 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1961).
There was no single majority opinion. Chairman Leedom and Members Jenkins
and Kimball each wrote separate concurring opinions. Chairman Leedom took the
position that an agency shop provision would be illegal under federal law in any state
in which employment could not legally be conditioned on "literal" membership in a
labor organization, even though an agency shop would be legal under state law.
Member Jenkins was of the opinion that an agency shop was permissible under federal
law only when it supplemented a valid provision conditioning employment on actual
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agency shop provision did not violate section 8(a) (3); that union security
was a mandatory bargaining subject; and, consequently, that the refusal
to bargain had been a violation of section 8(a) (5). 109 The Board reasoned
that the provisos to section 8(a)(3) are not exclusive but permissive, so
that any union security provision which requires no more than member-
ship in a labor organization within thirty days of employment is legal."°
Since the agency shop provision here only required payment of dues and
fees and did not require membership, it was legal.11 '
HIRING HALL AGREEMENTS
In Mountain Pacific the Board said that hiring hall agreements would
be considered unlawful per se unless they complied with certain conditions
laid down by the Board. 112 The Supreme Court rejected such per se de-
termination in Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB.' 18 The Court
membership in a labor organization. Member Kimball concurred in the opinion of
Member Jenkins and, in addition, said that an agency shop would effect a denial of
equal participation in the labor organization to which the employees would have to
pay dues.
'°9 General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1961).
110 In support of its conclusion the Board relied on two prior cases, Public Service
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418, 26 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1950), and American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B.
800, 29 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1952), and on the legislative history of section 8(a)(3) as set
out and interpreted in Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), and in
Union Starch and Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 25 L.R.R.M. 1176 (1949).
In both Public Service Co. and American Seating Co., the Board had held
that a support money clause supplementing a valid union shop clause was permissible
under section 8(a)(3).
The Radio Officers case is wholly distinguishable, but in commenting on the
provisos to section 8(a) (3) the Court said, "This legislative history (to the 1947
amendments) clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union
security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and
fees." 347 U.S. at 41.
111 The Board pointed out that there was nothing in the record to suggest that
anyone wishing to join the union would be denied membership.
112 Associated Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.RB. 883, 41 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1958).
The conditions were that the agreement must provide that :
(1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a nondis-
criminatory basis and shall not be based on or in any way affected by, union
membership, bylaws, rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or any other
aspect or obligation of union membership, policies or requirements.
(2) The employer retains the right to reject any job applicant referred
by the union.
(3) The parties to the agreement post in places where notices to em-
ployees and applicants for employment are customarily posted, all provisions
relating to the functioning of the hiring arrangement, including the safeguards
that we deem essential to the legality of an exclusive hiring agreement.
113 365 U.S. 667 (1961). The hiring hall agreement provided in part that:
Casual employees shall, wherever the Union maintains a dispatching service,
be employed only on a seniority basis in the Industry whenever such senior
employees are available. An available list with seniority status will be kept by
the Unions . . . • Seniority rating of such employees shall begin with a
minimum of three months service in the Industry, irrespective of whether
such employee is or is not a member of the Union. (Emphasis by the Court.)
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reasoned that, even though hiring hall agreements tend to encourage union
membership, they do not violate section 8(a) (3) unless the encouragement
is accomplished by discriminatory means. Thus in each case the Board will
be required to find actual discrimination in order to find that the agree-
ment is unlawful. Subsequent Board opinions have conformed to the
Court's mandate.74
SUPERSENIORITY FOR STRIKE REPLACEMENTS
Ever since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.P it has been accepted doctrine that an em-
ployer, not otherwise guilty of unfair labor practices, may hire permanent
replacements for economic strikers. A more difficult question has been what
sort of benefits an employer may confer on such replacements.
In General Electric Co. the Board held that the grant of additional
seniority (superseniority) to those willing to work during the strike was
a violation of section 8(a) (3)." 6 This has been the Board's position ever
since.
But in NLRB v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 117 the Court of Appeals for
On the same day the Court handed down its decision in Local 60, United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 365 U.S. 651 (1961), in which it held that, in the absence of any evidence
that the union had coerced any employee to become or remain a member, the Board
could not require the union to refund the dues and fees paid to it by its members who
were covered by an illegal union security agreement.
114 See Peterson Constr. Corp., 134 N,L.R.B. No. 152, 49 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1961) ;
Operating Eng'r Union (Proton Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 49 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1961);
Local 1172, Carpenters Union (Refinery Eng'r Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 48 L.R.R.M.
1666 (1961).
115 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Although holding that there was sufficient evidence in
the case before them to support the Board's finding that the employer had discharged
certain employees on account of their union activities, the Court said that:
an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has [not] lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers . . . . [Nor] is he bound to discharge those hired to fill the places
of strikers ... in order to create places for them. The assurance by respondent
to those who accepted employment during the strike that if they so desired
their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice, nor was it
such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places
to be filled.
116 80 N.L.R.B. 510, 23 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1948). Here employees willing to continue
working during an economic strike were given "continuous service credit" for the
period of the strike, while the strikers were not. "Service credit" was a basis for the
determination of certain real benefits such as seniority, vacations and pensions. The
Board found that, insofar as the nonstrikers received extra vacation and pension benefits
(which are in reality compensation), there was no violation, but that, insofar as they
received extra seniority, there was a violation of section 8(a) (3). The grant of seniority
to the nonstrikers made them less vulnerable to lay-off and discharge, relative to the
strikers, than they were before the strike. This was adjudged discrimination in regard
to tenure of employment. Except in the case of an economic striker replaced during
the strike, said the Board, a striker's employment relationship cannot be severed or
impaired on account of his strike activity.
117 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951).
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the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a similar Board order." 8 The court
reasoned that, although superseniority does tend to discourage union activi-
ties, it is not an unfair labor practice because the benefit conferred upon re-
placements is a benefit reasonably appropriate for the employer to confer in
attempting to "protect and continue his business." The court also held that
superseniority could be offered to the replacements at any time. Thus the
employer need not prove that superseniority was offered to the replace-
ments as an inducement to get them to work." 8
There was no Board decision directly contrary to Potlatch until Erie
Resistor Corp.' 2° There the Board, in a well reasoned opinion, held that
superseniority is discrimination against a striker in violation of section
8(a) (3). It is discriminatory, when offered to members of the bargaining
unit, because it constitutes an offer of individual benefit to strikers to
abandon the strike and return to work. In other contexts such an offer
has been held to be an independent 8(a)(1) violation. 121 It dues not fall
within the dicta of the Mackay Radio case'22 because the discrimination is
of indefinite duration. The Board expressed confidence that the Supreme
Court did not intend to permit preferred treatment of nonstrikers long
after the strike had ended. Nor, "in view of the immediate consequences
to employees' tenure which follow from a grant of superseniority," was
specific evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent necessary. 123
118 Potlatch Forest, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193, 25 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1949). In this
case it was not until after the union gave up the strike that the employer drafted
the "Return-to-Work" policy under which the strikers were to be laid off before any
of those who worked or were hired during the strike. The Board's reasoning was
essentially the same as in General Electric Co., supra note 116.
119 This latter holding was rejected by the Supreme Court in Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957). The Court was so clear on this that
it cut off the petitioner's argument and affirmed from the bench.
120 132 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 48 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1961). During an economic strike,
the employer asked the strikers to return to work, telling them that if they refused
they would be replaced by new employees to whom the employer had offered permanent
employment. A few days later the employer announced that all strikers who returned to
work and all permanent replacements would be given an additional twenty years
seniority to ensure the permanence of their positions. The union voted to consider this
an unfair labor practice and to continue striking until the employer recanted—a threat
which the union was unable to carry out. Sometime after the strike certain of the
strikers were laid off earlier than they would have been but for the superseniority
granted to the nonstrikers. After bargaining the union and the company agreed to
submit the question to the NLRB without filing charges. This form of submission
raises doubts as to the enforceability of the order, but should not affect the value of
the case as an indication of the Board's position on superseniority.
121 See, e.g., Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 417, 46 L.R.R.M.
1030 (1960); Marlboro Electronic Parts Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 122, 45 L.R.R.M. 1516
(1960).
122 Supra note 115.
123 The Board also held that the insistence of the employer, during the strike, on
the superseniority plan converted the strike into an unfair labor practice strike. This
gave all strikers, not permanently replaced before the union declared that it was
striking against the unfair labor practice, the right to reinstatement as of the day
on which the strike ended.
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In view of the Board's firm position in this matter and the abrupt,
per curiam treatment which the Supreme Court gave to the Olin Mathieson
decision,124 it is improbable that the Board will meet any further resistance
from the courts.
THE EFFECT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES ON UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE STRIKERS
It has long been held that the right to strike without incurring discharge
does not extend to employees whose strike is a breach of contract and is
not caused by the employer's unfair labor practices. 125 But this does not
necessarily foreclose the right of employees to strike against unfair labor
practices of the employer, even though the existing collective bargaining
agreement contains a broad no-strike clause.
Initially the Board held that there was no unfair labor practice in the
suspension of employees who, in violation of a no-strike clause, struck to
protest the discriminatory discharge of another employee.'" The Board
reasoned that the no-strike clause should be enforced, in spite of the
employer's unfair labor practice, because such clauses advance the purposes
of the act by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
The Board was of the opinion that, since its unfair labor practice procedures
were sufficient to protect the employees, the no-strike provision could safely
be given effect.'27
Five years later, however, the Board cast some doubt on the worth
of the National Electric case128 by its decision in Mastro Plastics Corp.' 29
Here the no-strike provision was equally as broad as that in National
Electric,13° but the Board said that it applied only to strikes instigated by
124 Supra note 119.
125 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
126 National Elec. Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995, 23 L.R.R.M. 1148 (1948).
The Board found that the discharge of the first employee was a discriminatory discharge
within the meaning of 8(3) of the Wagner Act, but that the suspension of the
protest strikers was justified by their breach of the following clause in the collective
bargaining agreement: "[Slhould any dispute arise between the Company and the
Union or any employee and the Company ... there shall be no interruption or im-
peding of the work, work stoppages, strikes or lockouts on account of such differences,
but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences in accordance with (the
established grievance) procedure. . . ."
127 Chairman Herzog concurred in the disposition of the instant case but objected
to the broad language used by the majority. He felt that, in a serious unfair labor
practice situation, human nature and Board delay would almost certainly combine to
bring on a strike or other self help, regardless of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. This knowledge, he said, would enable the employers, under the broad rule
implied by the Board's decision, to commit serious unfair labor practices with relative
impunity.
128 Supra note 126.
125 103 N.L.R.I3. 511, 31 L.R.R.M. 1494 (1953).
130 The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be
no interference of any kind with the operations of the Employers, or any
interruptions or slackening of production or work by any of its members.
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disputes over matters covered in the contract. It went on to distinguish
National Electric by pointing out that there the strike was in protest of the
discharge of an employee under the union shop provision of the contract—
a matter covered by the contract—whereas the strike in Mastro Plastics
protested the discharge of an employee for his activities on behalf of the
incumbent union—a matter not covered by the contract. The real distinction
between the two cases lies in the almost unqualified approval given to broad
no-strike provisions by the majority in National Electric, as contrasted with
the refusal of the majority in Mastro Plastics to find that such breadth exists
in the absence of explicit language. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the Board was unanimously upheld in its interpretation of the scope
of the no-strike provision, although three Justices dissented on another
issue.131
But this concurrence of Court and Board has by no means settled the
matter. In 1958, two years after the Court's decision in Mastro Plastics, the
Board again reversed its field by holding that a protest strike against
the discriminatory discharge of an employee violated a no-strike provision
which prohibited strikes only until an expeditious grievance procedure had
been exhausted. The no-strike clause did not specifically ban unfair labor
practice strikes. 132
Then in the recent case of Arians Dept. Store,' 33 the new Board
grafted still another important exception onto the Mastro Plastics doctrine.
Again they were faced with a broad no-strike clause which did not expressly
The Union further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work
stoppages during the term of this agreement.
131 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In its acceptance of the
Board's interpretation of the contract, the Court clearly was influenced by the
seriousness of the unfair labor practices which caused the strike. The employer had
culminated a series of unfair labor practices aimed at the incumbent union by dis-
charging one of its leaders. So although the Court narrowly interpreted the no-strike
clause as being aimed solely "at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by
efforts to change existing economic relationships," there is little doubt that they were
prompted by a fear that a broader interpretation would open the way for a ruthless
ouster of the bargaining representative.
The other issue in the case was whether employees who struck in protest against
unfair labor practices within the sixty day period proscribed by 8(d) lost their
status as employees under the act. A six to three majority held that they did not.
132 Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317, 42 L.R.R.M. 1552
(1958). The pertinent parts of the no-strike clause were:
should differences arise between the Company and the Union, or the Com-
pany and an employee concerning any discharge . . . there shall be no . . .
strikes . . . nor any other action taken by the Union . . . on account of such
grievance until all the steps in the grievance procedure set forth have been
observed and these steps have failed to produce a settlement.
The Board said that it was clear that the grievance procedure, at the option of the
union or aggrieved employee, could be completed in about five days. Since the em-
ployees gave up their right to strike only for a brief period, the Board felt that it
did not have to be as strict in construing the contract as they were in Mastro Plastics
Corp.
133 133 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 48 L.R.R.M. 1731 (1961).
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prohibit unfair labor practice strikes, 184 and a strike by certain employees
in protest of the discharge of another employee for his union activity.
The trial examiner found that the discharge of the employee was illegal
discrimination and coercion under sections 8(a) (1) and 8 (a) (3); he also
found that the discrimination did not extend to the other employees. The
Board used this latter finding as the basis for holding that the discharge of
the strikers was permissible under the no-strike clause and was not an
unfair labor practice. The Board took the position that only "serious"
unfair labor practices should exempt a strike from a broad no-strike pro-
vision. This discriminatory discharge was not so serious as to be "destructive
of the foundations on which collective bargaining must rest" as were the
unfair labor practices in Mastro Plastics. The test of what is that serious is
to be one of experience, good sense and good judgment.'"
The apparent result of all these cases is that, in this area, too, the
Board has rejected all rigid rules and will henceforth determine the effective-
ness of no-strike provisions on the basis of a number of factors, including
the expediency and effectiveness of the available grievance procedures,'"
and the kind of impact which the unfair labor practice has upon the members
of the bargaining unit. If the Mastro Plastics rule was ever a rigid one, the
Court's preference for arbitration instead of strikes in an unrelated case
indicates a retreat from that rigidity.'"
DISCHARGE AFTER BELATED TENDER OF UNION DUES
One of the most poorly received of all the old Board's per se rules was
that which made a delinquent employee's full and unqualified tender of all
dues and fees, at any time prior to actual discharge, an absolute bar to
discharge under a union security agreement.'" The rule was never accepted
134 "The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement there shall be no
strikes, stoppages, or slowdowns of work by the Union or any of its members."
138 Just three months earlier the Board had rejected the application of the
"seriousness" doctrine in Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 48 L.R.R.M. 1280
(1961). There are two important distinctions between the two cases. In Ford Motor
Co. there was a finding that the protested firing was designed to discourage membership
in an independent union which sought to replace the UAW as bargaining representative.
In Arians the Board found that the discriminatory discharge was not intended as a
broad warning to all the employees to refrain from seeking a change in their bargaining
representative. And in Ford Motor Co, the Board noted that the UAW was less
than vigorous in its advocacy of the aggrieved employees cause. Nothing of the sort
appears in Arians.
138 Compare General Motors Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 49 L.R.R.M. 1283
(1961), and Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc., supra note 132, with Ford Motor Co.,
supra note 135.
187 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2717 (1962). This
was a breach of contract action brought under § 301 of the NLRA. One of the issues
before the Court was whether a no-strike provision was implicit in a clause providing
for compulsory, terminal arbitration in any dispute arising under the contract. In an
opinion from which only Mr. Justice Black dissented, the Court held that it was.
138 Aluminum Workers, AFL (Metal Ware Corp.), 112 N.L.R.B. 619, 36 L.R.R.M.
1077 (1955). The Board found a violation of section 8(b)(2) where the union re-
quested and obtained the discharge of an employee under a valid union security
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by any court,"° and has now been overruled by the new Board.'"
The new Board assigned two reasons for discarding the old rule. First,
there can be little, if any, union security when dissident members can
frustrate the orderly administration of lawful collective bargaining agree-
ments by delaying payment of required dues and fees until the last moment
before actual discharge. Secondly, the only possible basis for holding such
a discharge to be an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a) (3) or
8(b) (2) would be the existence of some motive for discharge other than
the failure to pay the required dues and fees. There is no merit in a rule
which assumes the existence of such a motive in the absence of evidence to
support the assumption.
Now that the Aluminum Workers"' rule has been laid to rest, each
case will be decided on its particular facts.
HOT CARGO AGREEMENTS
Section 8(e) makes any contract or agreement, violative of its terms,
void and unenforceable without regard to when the agreement was made.
There is, however, no unfair labor practice unless the parties "enter into"
the illegal agreement after the effective date of the 1959 Amendments. The
Board has resolved this paradox by holding, in two recent cases, that any act
of affirmance or effectuation of clauses illegal under section 8(e) constitutes
"entering into" an illegal agreement and is, therefore, an unfair labor prac-
tice. 142
agreement for his failure to pay back dues and reinstatement fees. The employee had
made a full and unqualified tender of the back dues before the request for discharge
was made, and made a full and unqualified tender of the reinstatement fee after the
request but before actual discharge.
This decision overruled Chisholm-Ryder Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 508, 26 L.R.R.M. 1062
(1951), which held that, to be effective, a tender of union dues and fees must be made
within the time required by the union rules.
139 The broad rule of the Aluminum Workers case was expressly disapproved by
the Second Circuit in International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 247 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1957), and by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Technicolor Motion Picture
Corp., 248 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1957). Even the Seventh Circuit, which enforced the
Board's order in NLRB v. Aluminum Workers, Local 135, 230 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.
1956), did so on the basis of the evidence and without regard to the broad rule laid
down by the Board.
140 General Motors Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 49 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1961). The
union requested the company to discharge an employee, under a union security agree-
ment, because of the employee's delinquency in the payment of his dues. There was
no evidence of any other union motive. Before he was actually discharged, the employee
offered to pay the amount of his delinquency. The union refused the offer and pressed
for his discharge. When the company discharged him, the employee filed 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2) charges. The Board dismissed the complaint. Accord Acme Fast Freight, Inc.,
134 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 49 L.R.R.M. 1286 (1961).
141 Supra note 138.
142 Local 618, Teamsters Union (Greater St. Louis Auto. Trimmers and Upholsterers
Ass'n), 134 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 49 L.R.R.M. 1326 (1961) ; District 9, IAM (Greater
St. Louis Auto. Trimmers and Upholsterers Ass'n), 134 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 49 L.R.R.M.
1321 (1961).
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The clause in question, essentially the same in each case, provided that
"whenever the employer finds it feasible to send work out that comes under
the jurisdiction of the union and this contract, preference must be given to
shops or subcontractors having contracts with . . . [the union]."1"
District No. 9, /AM,'" an "entering into" was found when the union
refused to approve a subcontractor selected by one of the employers and then
sought mediation of the alleged contract violation. The mediation board
found that the clause was binding on all parties. In Local 618, Teamsters, 145
there was an "entering into" when an employer, in response to union pres-
sure, agreed not to send work to an unapproved subcontractor. In both
cases the Board justified its holding on the theory that Congress could not
have intended to allow affirmation, maintenance, or effectuation of illegal
hot cargo agreements. 14°
COURT REVERSALS INDICATING POSSIBLE NEW TRENDS
Two recent Court of Appeals opinions indicate additional areas in which
the new Board might be expected to overturn old Board policies. 147
In Swift & Co. the old Board had held that the filing of 8(a) (1) and
8(a)(2) charges by an intervening union, coupled with a 30% showing of
interest, made negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement with the
incumbent union a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a) (2)." 8 The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to enforce the order on the ground
that negotiation of a contract with one of several rival unions can constitute
an 8(a) (2) violation only where there is a "real question of representa-
tion.""° The facts found by the Board do no more than establish a claim on
the part of the intervenor which falls short of presenting a "real question of
representation."'"
In each case the collective bargaining agreement containing the illegal clause had
gone into effect prior to the effective date of the 1959 Amendments, and in each case
the acts of affirmance occurred after the effective date of the amendments.
143 The Board distinguished this from a clause which bans the subcontracting of
work normally performed by the employees. This clause allows subcontracting but
restricts the people with whom the employer can do business. Without ruling on the
validity of any clause which merely restricts subcontracting in order to preserve the
jobs and job rights of the members of the bargaining unit, the Board held this clause
to be a violation of 8(e). The Board was unable to find any difference between a
contract which prohibits an employer from using products produced by a nonunion
firm and a contract which causes an employer to cease subcontracting to a non-
union firm.
144 Supra note 142.
145 Supra note 142.
146 Members Fanning and Brown dissented in both cases on the ground that there
is a difference between "entering into" an agreement and "enforcing" it.
147 NLRB v. Swift & Co., 294 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Cascade Em-
ployers Ass'n, 296 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1961).
148 128 N.L.R.B. 732, 46 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1960).
146 NLRB v. Swift & Co., supra note 147.
150 The court noted that the membership cards used for the 30% showing of
interest have only slight evidentiary value when, as here, rival unions are competing
for membership. Furthermore, the Board had given no weight to the fact that, although
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In Cascade Employers Ass'n the company put into effect its own pro-
posals on group health insurance, payments to the pension program, wages
and the assignment of premium work after negotiations with the union on
these subjects had stalemated. On these facts the old Board found violations
of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5 ) . 15 ' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and remanded the case for
further fact findings.'" The court agreed that an inference of bad faith
arises from such employer activity, but refused to accept that inference as
conclusive without fact findings as to all the circumstances surrounding
the bargaining.'"
CONCLUSION
The reviewed cases leave no doubt as to the new Board's rejection of
the theory of per se violations. In place of the certainty of prediction sought
by the old Board, there has been substituted a more thorough appraisal
of each case. The ultimate, and perhaps the only, criteria for judging the
value of this approach will be the accumulated experiences of the prac-
titioners working under it.
Because the Board now requires more facts to support an unfair labor
practice charge, the General Counsel's burden of proof has become more
weighty. It would appear that the effect of this will be to decrease the
amount of Board intervention and to increase the freedom of the parties to
settle their own affairs.
JOSEPH D. BERMINGHAM, JR.
DAVID S.'WORONOFF
95% of the employees had given check-off authorization for the incumbent union,
there was not a single revocation during the escape period.
As an example of a case in which there was a real question of representation, the
court cited Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 441, 32 L.R.R.M. 1276
(1953). In that case the incumbent union's certification was five years old and it had
just terminated an unsuccessful strike during which many of its adherents had been
replaced. The intervenor had made a claim and filed an election petition.
151 126 N.L.R.B. 1014, 45 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1960).
152 NLRB v. Cascade Employers Ass'n, supra note 147. As authority for the
proposition that the Board must consider the totality of conduct of both parties the
court cited NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), and NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953).
153 See NLRB v. Katz, 289 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1961),
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Calumet Constr., 502, 504 	 reversing
modifying
reversing
(sub silentio)
Fanelli Ford, 502, 505
	 reversing
Middle South Brd.	 modifying
(WOGA) 495, 500
	
distinguishing
Minn. House Furn., 497, 503
Plauche Electric, 502, 504
Perfection Mattress, 494
reversing
reversing
modifying
distinguishing
reversing
APPENDIX
(page references are to text of comment)
REPRESENTATION 9(3)
American Brd. Co., 493
American Cyanamid, 489
Ballentine Packing, 492
Crumley Hotel, 491
D. V. Display, 491
Felix Half, 488
Ideal Electric, 493
Paragon Products, 492
_Plaza Provision, 490
Quaker City Life Ins., 489
Sheffield, 489
Wm. J. Burns Det., 491
reversing
reversing
reversing
reversing
reversing
reversing
modifying
reversing
reversing
reversing
reversing
reversing
American Brd. Co., 493
American Cyanamid, 487
American Linen, 492
Crumley Hotel, 491
Zia Co., 491
Cook Paint, 488
Woolworth, 493
Keystone Coat & Apron, 493
Valley of Va., 490
Metropolitan Life, 489
Litton Ind., 489
Columbia Southern, 491
SECONDARY BOYCOTT 8(B)(4)*
Calumet Constr., 494
Ryan Constr., 498, 504
Lewis Food, 502, 505
Lewis Food, 502, 505
Moore Dry Dock, 493, 499, 501
Washington Coca Cola,
494, 499, 501
Perfection Mattress, 494, 503
Washington Coca Cola.
494, 499, 501
Moore Dry Dock, 493, 499, 501
Denver Bldg. Trades, 501, 502
Perfection Mattress, 494, 503
* Lohman, 494-97, Servette, 495, and Schepps, 494, while not reversing or modi-
fying any specific cases, do effect major alterations in the scope of the 8(b) (4) publicity
proviso.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING 8(B) (7)
Chariton Press, 508,09 	 reversing
	
Charlton Press, 506-07
Crown Cafe., 508-09	 reversing
	
Crown Cafe., 506-07
Stork Club, 509-10
	 reversing
	
Stork Club, 506-07
MANAGEMENT COERCION 8(A) (3)
Arians Dept. Store, 516	 modifying
	 Mastro Plastics, 516-17
Erie Resistor, 514
	 rejecting	 Potlach Forests, 513
G.M. Corp., 512
	 reversing	 G.M. Corp., 511
G.M. Corp., 518	 reversing
	
Aluminum Workers, 517-18
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